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INTRODUCTION

INCE THE INCEPTION of powered flight over a century
ago, aviation has undergone many phases of technological
advancement and regulatory changes. The Wright Brothers'
first flight, from liftoff to touchdown, encompassed a distance
that is less than the wingspan of today's modern jetliner.1 The
sensation of freedom that undoubtedly accompanied that historic first flight has since been augmented with countless rules
and regulations.
This article will explore the agreements between and among
airlines and airports, as they relate to landing fees, terminal
space leases, and gate leases. Any such agreements may not be
viewed, however, in a vacuum. A multitude of factors exist that,
to varying degrees, bear on these agreements, both directly and
indirectly. Although by no means an exhaustive list, some of
these factors include: the exclusivity of the agreement, the airline's status as signatory or non-signatory, the duration of the
agreement, and non-aeronautical concessionaire agreements.
Moreover, of great significance is the enactment of The Airline
Deregulation Act of 1978,2 which arguably changed the airline
industry forever.
Accordingly, the first part of this article will provide a historical background of aviation legislation in terms of the foundation
it laid for future agreements. Secondly, it will explore the introduction of The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 and the present regulatory structure. The impact of this legislation on
airlines, airports, and their previously-entered-into agreements
is of great import. Next will be an analysis of the agreements'
elements, including the various areas of negotiation between airlines and airports. Finally, we will conclude with an assessment
of the merits of the present system and its potential problems.
1 The flight covered a distance of 120 feet. The Wright Brothers - First Flight,
1903, Eye Witness to History, at http://www.eyewitnesstohistory.com (2003) (last
visited May 31, 2005). The wingspan of the Boeing 757 is 124 feet, 10 inches. US
AIRWAYS B-757/B-767 PILOT's HANDBOOK 5-1.
2 Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified
in various sections of U.S.C.).
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II.

LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND

It is noteworthy at the outset that the term "Deregulation"
should not be construed to mean absence of regulation. While a
detailed examination of the aviation industry's regulatory history is necessarily beyond the scope of this article, it will nevertheless prove useful to provide a brief overview of the legislation
which formed the basis for today's environment. Regulation of
the Transportation industry traces its genesis to the days of the
railroads.' Of primary interest to the federal government were
anti-trust concerns. 4 For example, dating back to 1912, in United
States v. Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis, the Supreme
Court held that the actions of some thirty-eight defendant railroads, in attempting to unify the railway terminal facilities serving St. Louis, violated the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.5 Further
discussion of this topic will be deferred until later in this article,
but, suffice it to say, such concerns have shown no indication of
acquiescence in the ensuing years.

A.

AIR

MAIL ACTS

Aviation itself has been subjected to various forms of scrutiny
and regulation as early as the days of the Air Mail Contracts,
beginning with the Air Mail Act of 1925,6 also known as the Kelly
Act, which gave the Post Office the right to contract with air
carriers for airmail service. 7 The first amendment to this act
provided that airlines would be paid by the pound for carrying
mail; the second amendment decreased the cost of an airmail
stamp, thereby fostering the public's use of the airmail system.8
"The Post Office's airmail department was no longer legally
forced to operate at a profit under the provisions of this second
amendment; hence, the airlines could actually be subsidized."9
As will be seen under the discussion of Deregulation, infra, such
subsidization ceased to exist in the Deregulated era.
3 See generally United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383
(1912).
4

Id.

Id. (interpreting Sherman Anti-Trust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2004)).
6 Air Mail Act of 1925, ch. 128, 43 Stat. 805 (current version at 39 U.S.C.
§§ 5401-02 (2004)).
7 V. FOSTER ROLLO, AVIATION LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 54 (5th ed. 2000).
8 Id.
9 Id.
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The profitability of the airmail contracts provided little incentive for the carriage of passengers.1 ° The Air Mail Act of 1930,11
also known as the McNary-Watres Act, was enacted in an attempt
to create such an incentive for the airlines. 12 The 1930 Act authorized the Postmaster General to extend the life of existing
mail contracts by converting them into route certificates, granting route extensions, or subjecting them to competitive bidding.13 A by-product of this was that competitive bidding
became a requirement for the awarding of contracts for new
routes or to airlines not currently engaged in a mail contract. 14
As a result, competition between airlines became regulated, and
airlines began to consolidate. 5 The airlines that emerged
under this scheme "were to fly almost free of competition for
the next forty-five years."' 6 It may be said that this marked the
beginning of the regulated era that prevailed within the industry
until the introduction of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978.
B.

CIVIL

AERONAUTICS ACT

The next significant legislation was the Civil Aeronautics Act
of 1938,17 sometimes referred to as the McCarran-Lea Act. This
act established a five-member board, known as the Civil Aeronautics Authority (CAA), with the responsibility of overseeing
activities within the aviation industry.' One of these responsibilities was the issuance of Certificates of Convenience and Necessity to those air carriers who were providing service at the
time of enactment of the McCarran-Lea Act. 9 These duties were
subsequently transferred to the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB),
created under the Reorganization Act of 1939.21 "A board-issued certificate is required before any carrier may provide air
service in this country. The criteria for certification.., require
the applicant to be 'fit, willing and able' and that the service be
10Id. at 55.
11 Air Mail Act of 1930, ch. 223, 46 Stat. 259 (current version at 39 U.S.C.
§§ 5401-02 (2004)).
12 ROLLO, supra note 7, at 55.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 56.
15

Id.

16
17

Id.
Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973.
ROLLO, supra note 7, at 59.

18

19 Id.
20 Reorganization Act of 1939, ch. 36, 53 Stat. 561 (current version at 31 U.S.C.
§§ 701, 1101 (2004)).
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required by the 'public convenience and necessity.'

773
'' 21

Such

regulatory legislation "was promulgated... to avoid the deleterious consequences of cutthroat and excessive competition, and
thereby enhance economic stability, safety, and the sound
growth and development of this young industry. ' 22 The CAB
retained its regulatory power until the enactment of the Airline
Deregulation Act of 1978, to be discussed later in this article. 3
C.

FEDERAL AVIATION ACT

The Federal Aviation Act 24 was enacted in 1958, ostensibly in

response to several accidents within the industry.25 Largely as a
result of the introduction of jet transport aircraft in the mid
1950s, numerous industry growing pains were identified.26
Among these were outdated Air Traffic Control (ATC) facilities
and equipment, "undersized runways and crowded terminal
buildings. '2 7 Perhaps most significant, the Federal Aviation Act,
inter alia, abolished the CAA and gave its responsibilities to the
newly created Federal Aviation Agency (FAA).28 While many of
the CAB's former duties and responsibilities were also transferred to the FAA, the CAB "retained economic control of U.S.
air carriers in a practically unaltered way."2z9 This economic control was vested in the CAB until its ultimate demise in 1985.30
D.

AiRPORT AND AiRWAYS DEVELOPMENT ACT

The next relevant enactment was that of the Airport and Airways Development Act of 1970,31 "designed to meet new demands for public air transportation needs. 3 2 While much of
21 JEFFREY R. MILLER, THE AIRLINE DEREGULATION HANDBOOK 9 (Merton House

1981).
22 Suzanne Imes, Airline PassengerFacility Charges: What Do They Meanfor an Ail-

ing Industry?, 60 J. AIR L. & COM. 1039, 1042-43 (1995) (quoting Paul S. Dempsey, TransportationDeregulation - On a Collision Course?, 13 TRANsp. LJ. 329, 335

(1984)).
supra note 21, at 11.
Federal Aviation Act, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (current version at 49
U.S.C. §§ 40101-19 (2004)).
25 ROLLO, supra note 7, at 61.
26 Id. at 60.
23 MILLER,

24

27 Id.
28 Id. at 61.
29 Id.
30 MILLER, supra note 21, at 11.
31 Airport and Airways Development

219.
32

ROLLO, supra note 7, at 67.

Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-258, 84 Stat.
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the prior legislation was directed toward the air carriers and
their operations, the Airport and Airways Development Act focused on the airports. "A controversial portion of the act is the
requirement for airport operating certificates for those airports
served by air carriers.""3 Critics aver that the minimum safety
standards set forth in the Federal Aviation Regulations for obtaining such operating certificates resulted in the federal government gaining "considerable control over airports."34
E. AiRLINE DEREGULATION ACT
The final piece of legislation of historical significance is, of
course, the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (ADA). "The overriding objective of the act is to foster competition within the
airline industry. Other objectives include encouraging the entry
of new and existing air carriers into new markets; continuing
service to small communities; and encouraging use of secondary
airports.

' 35

Among its many provisions was the demise of the

CAB in 1985, at which time the Department of Transportation
(DOT) assumed many of the CAB's former responsibilities. 6
The next section of this article will explore the impact of the
ADA on airport and airline agreements, as well as the operation
of the airline industry in the current deregulated environment.
III.

THE AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT OF 1978 AND
ITS IMPACT ON THE CURRENT
OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

As its name implies, with the ADA came an industry trend toward increased competition and away from regulation. In some
instances, the move from regulation to deregulation was gradual
and incremental. One such instance is the Essential Air Service 7 provision of the ADA, which ensured that those communities which had previously been served by a certificated air carrier
would continue to have such service for a period of ten years
after the enactment of the ADA.3 8 The CAB devised procedures
for identifying these "eligible points" and for determining appropriate levels of service. 9 An eligible point was primarily de33Id.
34 Id.
35 MILLER,
36

supra note 21, at 11.

Id.

37 14 C.F.R. § 325 (1980).
38 LAWRENCE E. GESELL, AVIATION AND THE LAW 357 (3d ed. 1998).
39

Id.
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fined as "[a] ny point in the United States ...to which any direct

air carrier was authorized, under a certificate issued by the
CAB ...to provide air service on October 24, 1978, whether or
not such service was actually provided. ' 40 This provision was no

longer enforced upon the expiration of the ten-year period.
A.

HUB AND SPOKE SYSTEM

A prominent characteristic of this increase in competition
under deregulation is reflected in the development of hub and
spoke route structures. 4 ' Although "[s]uch route structures
were certainly not unknown under regulation ... they were not

characteristic of the pre-deregulation airlines."4 2 Statistics indicate that in 1977 (pre-deregulation), departures from Dallas
and Chicago comprised only 25.0% of American's flights, while
Denver and Chicago departures accounted for a mere 19.6% of
United's flights. 43 In contrast, figures for 1985, seven years after
deregulation, show that the hub and spoke structure at those
cities increased their share of domestic departures to 38.0% for
American and 30.6% for United.' 4 Under this now familiar
method of operation, airlines pick up passengers at outlying airports (spoke) and fly them to a primary airport (hub)." While
some passengers may in fact be destined for the hub airport,
many passengers will be continuing their journey beyond this
point.46 After deplaning at the hub airport, these connecting
passengers will "combine with passengers from other origin cities plus those who begin their journeys at the hub to make up
enough traffic to fill a plane from their hub to their
destinations. "4
The success of a hub and spoke system is, in large measure,
dependent upon an airline's access to gate and terminal facilities at the hub airport. "Typically, an airline requires at least five
gates to create a small hub."4 The existence of long-term lease
agreements, discussed infra, greatly impacts such accessibility for
40

14 C.F.R. § 325.3(a) (2004).

41 Michael E. Levine, Airline Competition in DeregulatedMarkets: Theory, Firm Strategy, and Public Policy, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 393, 411 (1987).
42 Id.

43Id. at 412.
4 Id.
45Id. at 443.
46 Id,
47 Id.

48 Note, The Antitrust Implications of Airport Lease Restrictions, 104 HARv. L. REv.
548, 558-59 (1990).
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airlines attempting to gain entry into a particular airport.49 One
or more airlines holding long-term, exclusive leases at a hub airport "can reduce its new entrant rival's ability to attract traffic to
its service by forcing it to accommodate its schedule to the availability of a gate, thus disrupting its connections at its distant
hub."5 Through majority-in-interest clauses, discussed infra, incumbent airlines further have the ability to approve (or, perhaps more significantly, disapprove) critical airport construction
projects, thereby influencing and controlling availability of terminal facilities. 5 '
B.

INDUSTRY CONSOLIDATION

Another important by-product of deregulation has been the
consolidation of the industry. After the enactment of the ADA
in 1978, the CAB's responsibilities were gradually and systematically shifted to other agencies.5 2 Initially, regulatory authority
over mergers was bestowed upon the DOT, but, in 1989, it was
subsequently transferred to the Department of Justice (DOJ)Y"
Through mergers, acquisitions and bankruptcies, the industry
has undergone a transformation unlike any in54its history. "Since
1978, we've seen 130 airlines come and go."

The failure of an airline causes consternation not only for its
employees and the traveling public, but for the airports with
which the airline has lease agreements. Just as the airlines themselves benefit from entering into long-term lease agreements, so
too do the airports. The predictable revenue stream resulting
from these leases affords the airport operator a certain sense of
financial security. However, the deregulated environment
under which airlines operate today provides no such assurances.

49 Id. at 559.

Levine, supra note 41, at 469.
51 Robert M. Hardaway, The FAA 'Buy-Sell' Slot Rule: Airline Deregulation at the
Crossroads, 52 J. AIR L. & COM. 1, 47 (1986).
50

52 JEFFERY

R.

MILLER, THE AIRLINE DEREGULATION HANDBOOK

11-12 (1981).

53 Alberto G. Rossi, Grounding Future Consolidations: United-US Airways Cancel
Right, 54 ADMIN. L. REv. 883, 886 (2002).
54 Perry Flint, Washington's Shadow of Doubt; Airline Deregulation,AIR TRANSPORT
WORLD, May 1998, at 47 (quoting Professor Daryl Jenkins, director of the Aviation Institute of George Washington University).
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1. Bankruptcies
The unfortunate result of deregulation has been the unprecedented number of bankruptcies within the industry.55 Legislation was enacted in 1992 in an attempt to protect some of the
nation's airport operators from this all-too-frequent occurrence.56 The Rail Safety Enforcement and Review Act,5 7 Section
19, "Airport Leases," "amends Section 365(d) of the Bankruptcy
Code to provide that the unexpired airport facility leases of a
bankrupt airline are deemed rejected, at the option of the airport operator, five days after a so-called termination event."58
Under the statute, a termination event was rather narrowly defined as a Chapter 7 liquidation, conversion of an existing bankruptcy reorganization to a liquidation, or the granting of certain
relief to creditors under the Bankruptcy Code. 9 The statute was
further restrictive "in that it only applie[d] to an air carrier
holding at least 65% of the gates of a facility that qualifies as a
'large air traffic hub,' as defined by FAA regulations ....

-60 Fi-

nally, the statute was applicable only for a period of 12 months,
expiring in September 1993.61 Although intended to address an
issue of growing concern within the industry, the limited scope
of this statute necessarily rendered it ineffective.
While an airline's bankruptcy inflicts many financial hardships both on the airline and its creditors, it is often the competitor airlines that are in a position to benefit from the other's
misfortune. In Midway Airlines, Inc. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.,
Midway, after ceasing operations due to bankruptcy, was in default on its gate lease agreement at Minneapolis/St. Paul International Airport (MSP).62 Northwest Airlines bid on Midway's
leasehold interest, offering to satisfy the amount in default,
along with an additional $5,000.63 Despite objections from the
Metropolitan Airports Commission (the operator of MSP), the
55 In recent years, many airlines have filed Chapter 13 and several have done
so twice or more.
56 Rail Safety Enforcement and Review Act, Pub. L. No. 102-365, 106 Stat. 972
(1992).
57 Id.

58 Anthony Michael Sabino, ProtectingAirport Operators' Terminal and Gate Leases
from Airline Bankruptcies, 2J. BANKR. L. & PRAc. 75, 75 (1993).
59 Id.
60

Id. at 76.

Id.
62 Midway Airlines, Inc. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 6 F.3d 492, 493 (7th Cir.
1993).
63 Id.
61
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Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals assigned the lease to Northwest.64 It is noteworthy that, at the time of this litigation, Northwest operated a hub at MSP, leasing 75% of the gates there.6"
2. New Entrants
Yet another significant impact of deregulation is the number
of new entrant carriers that have begun operations since 1978.
As discussed supra, prior to deregulation, the CAB issued certificates of convenience authorizing airlines to commence operations. The litmus test for issuance of such certificates was that
the carrier be "fit, willing and able," and the service was to be
required by "the public convenience and necessity.

'66

This stan-

dard resulted in the CAB's issuance of only six such certificates
in the twenty years preceding deregulation. By contrast, today's
standard under deregulation requires that "[t] he applicant must
still be "fit, willing and able," but the board must issue a certificate if the transportation is "consistent with the public convenience and necessity."67 This standard has resulted in the
issuance of an increasing number of certificates, based in part
on the fact that such consistency is presumed under the ADA.
Moreover, "the burden is on any opponents of the applicant to
demonstrate
any inconsistency with the public convenience and
68
necessity.

This acquiescence in the standard for obtaining a certificate
seemingly paves the way for the new-entrant carrier. However,
although clearly an essential component for entry, obtaining a
certificate is but one small piece of a large and complex puzzle.
The mere authority to operate an airline does not include such
other requisite elements as gates and terminal space. Once
granted the authority to operate, an airline must gain access to
airport facilities. While deregulation has made it infinitely easier for airlines to become certificated, the same may not be said
for their ability to gain access to some of the nation's airports.
The hub and spoke system, discussed supra, represents a formidable obstacle to the new-entrant airline. In establishing itself at a hub airport, the incumbent airline conducts a
disproportionate share of the flights operating from that air64

Id. at 497.

65

Id. at 494 n.1.

67

supra note 21, at 9 (emphasis added).
Id. at 12 (emphasis added).

68

Id.

66 MILLER,
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port. 69 Due to the economies of scale inherent in such an oper-

ation, it becomes a financial hardship for competitors to gain
sufficient market share. 70 Assuming, arguendo, that a new entrant airline elects to compete with a dominant carrier at a hub
airport, it must acquire the necessary facilities to do so. "Among
the most remarked-upon impediments to contestability in the
deregulated airline industry has been the 'shortage' of terminal
facilities, especially gate space. ' 71 Incumbent airlines can deter
the new entrant by employing any of a number of strategies:
tying up existing gates through the use of long-term, exclusive
leases; using their Majority-In-Interest status, discussed infra, to
limit construction of additional space; and subleasing gate space
to the new entrant at above-market prices, just to name a few.72
C.

SLOT ALLOCATION

After having successfully overcome the gate barriers, the new
entrant has positioned itself to begin service. Operating under
the premise that the airline intends to, ultimately, if not initially,
generate a profit from its revenues, it must schedule its flights so
as to attract the greatest number of passengers. This piece of
the puzzle may entail obtaining the right to take off and land at
the airport, known as a "slot." "A slot.., is a designated thirty
minute window of time during which an air carrier may launch
or land daily air traffic. ' 75 Certain airports, referred to as slotcontrolled airports, are subject to the "high density rule,"
adopted by the FAA in 1968 as a measure to reduce congestion. 4 The airports initially targeted were Chicago O'Hare
(ORD); New York John F. Kennedy International (JFK); New
York LaGuardia (LGA); New York Newark (EWR); and Washington National (DCA).7 Although the FAA reserved the right to
include additional airports in this list, none were subsequently
added.76 Moreover, despite being initially touted as a temporary
77
measure, the rule has been retained indefinitely.
69

Levine, supra note 41, at 468-69.

70 Id.

71 Id. at 463.
72 Id. at 469-70.
73 Valujet Airlines, Inc. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., No.1:95-cv-2896-GET,

1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13814, at *9 (N.D. Ga. July 12, 1996).
74 Eileen M. Gleimer, Slot Regulation at High Density Airports: How Did We Get
Here and Where Are We Going?, 61 J. AIR L. & COM. 877, 878 (1996).
75 Id.
76 Id. at 878-79.
77 Id. at 880.
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Prior to deregulation, competing airlines convened their respective Scheduling Committees to allocate the slots equitably
among them. 7 ' These agreements were submitted to, and commonly approved by, the CAB. 7' Any conflicts noted by the CAB
were to be resolved via voluntary adjustments by the airlines
themselves."' "Because of the requirement that schedule
changes be voluntary, the schedule changes could not be made
unless there was unanimity among the affected carriers. Not
surprisingly, unanimity was difficult to achieve and at times impossible, particularly after deregulation."'" This phenomenon
served to exacerbate the difficulties encountered by new-entrant
airlines.
In an effort to ameliorate this apparent inequity, in 1985 the
FAA instituted the "buy-sell rule," which provided that "permanent slots... could be purchased, sold, traded, or leased by any
party... on a daily, weekly, monthly, or any other basis. 8s2 Embodied within this rule was a "use-or-lose" provision, requiring
airlines to use their slots a specified percentage of the time to
avoid forfeiting them. 3 In theory, this was to make underutilized slots available for new entrants.8 4 In practical application,
however, the airlines in possession of the slots leased them to
competitors, on a short-term basis, "to meet the minimum use
requirement since the leasing mechanism also limits the com85
petitor's ability to gain a permanent foothold at the airport.
Such an arrangement allows the incumbent airline to retain possession and control of the slots, while potentially charging
above-market rates for the lease. Although the new entrant has
gained access to the airport, it has done so on a short-term basis
and at great expense.
Under the present regulatory structure, although many private airports exist today, "major air carrier airports in the United
States are operated by public entities at the state, regional, or
local level. 81 6 In our nation's capital, for example, the airports
(Washington National, Washington - Dulles, and Baltimore78

Id. at 881.

79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id.

Id. at 887.
Id. at 889.
84 Gleimer, supra note 74, at 889.
85 Id. at 910.
86 49 U.S.C. § 49101(5)(2004).
82
83
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Washington International) are all operated by the Metropolitan
Washington Airports Authority ("Airports Authority")?. The
Airports Authority is "a political subdivision constituted only to
operate and improve the Metropolitan Washington Airports as
primary airports serving the Metropolitan Washington area. '"88
Among the authority granted to the Airports Authority is the
right "to acquire, maintain, improve, operate, protect, and promote the Metropolitan Washington Airports for public purposes; to issue bonds. . .; to acquire real and personal
property... ; and to levy fees or other charges." 9

Although the right to levy fees and charges exists, that right is
not without its limitations. The Federal Anti-Head Tax Act forbids any state agency to "levy or collect a tax, fee, head charge,
or other charge on an individual traveling in air commerce," or
on "the transportation of an individual traveling in air commerce" 90 unless they are "reasonable rental charges, landing
fees, and other service charges from aircraft operators for the
using airport facilities." 91 Additionally, the Airport and Airways
Development Act of 1970 requires that airports receiving federal
subsidies be "available for public use on fair and reasonable
terms and without unjust discrimination."92

D.

ANTI-TRUST CONSIDERATIONS

Violation of the above limitations appears in the form of antitrust litigation. Such litigation has arisen between and among
the airlines, and between the airlines and airport operators.
Pertinent legislation is Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act
which prohibits "[elvery contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations."93 The
United States Supreme Court, in United States v. Grinnell Corp.,94
95
emphasized that under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, designed to halt the growth of monopolies, the offense of monop87

49 U.S.C. § 49101(2).

88 49 U.S.C. § 49106(a)(1)(B) (3).
89

49 U.S.C. §§ 49106(b) (1)(A)-(C), (E).

90 49 U.S.C. §§ 40116(b)(1)-(2).

91 49 U.S.C. § 40116(e) (2).
92 Airport and Airways Development Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-258, 84 Stat.

219.
93 15 U.S.C. § 1.
94 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
95 15 U.S.C. § 2.
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oly has two elements: "(1) the possession of monopoly power in
the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of superior product, business acumen,
or historic accident.

96

Arguably among the most contentious aspects of airline antitrust litigation are airport lease agreements. Long-term lease
agreements, Majority-In-Interest clauses, hub and spoke operations, and limited slot and gate availability all give rise to the
potential anti-competitive practices comprising this litigation.
Prior to its dissolution in 1985, the CAB was responsible for reviewing and approving "any agreements between carriers affecting air transportation ....
-97 "Any agreement approved by the
board was automatically given immunity from the antitrust laws
and was thereby insulated from any antitrust action arising
within the scope of the approved agreement."9 8 The CAB's authority was significantly reduced as a result of the ADA, particularly with respect to mergers and acquisitions, when such
authority was transferred to the Department of Justice. 9
To mitigate the effects of the long-term lease agreements, airlines have entered into sub-lease agreements. 100 Under these
agreements, facilities such as gates or takeoff and landing slots
are sub-leased to competitor airlines. This allows the lessor airline to retain ownership of the facilities while exerting a measure of control over its competitor lessee. Although the newentrant carrier has gained access to an airport, it incurs considerable expense in doing so. The incumbent carrier benefits
from such a sub-lease arrangement in multiple ways. First, it retains ownership of the gate(s), effectively reserving the right to
reclaim them upon termination of the typically short-duration
sub-lease. Second, by sub-leasing the gates, the incumbent has
complied with the common provision in its own lease with the
airport that the gates be used a certain minimum amount. Absent the sub-lease, the underutilized gates may be forfeited to
the airport, only to potentially be leased to the new-entrant competitor on a long-term basis. Next, the incumbent airline establishes the lease rate to be paid by the sub-lessee. As might be
96

384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
21, at 7.

97 MILLER, supra note
98 Id.

99 Id. at 15.

100 Robert Hardaway, Economics of Airport Regulation, 20
(1991).
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expected, these rates are typically above market rates, by operation of the law of supply and demand. In an agreement between
Southwest Airlines and Northwest Airlines, for example, Northwest charged "$150 per flight for a sub-lease of two gates or
'about nineteen times what Northwest pays the airport authority
to lease the space."' 01 Finally, not uncommon in such sub-leases
are clauses which require that the lessee also contract the
ground handling services of the lessor.
In Valujet Airlines, Inc. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,102 plaintiff
Valujet alleged violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act
against two competitor airlines in contracting for takeoff and
landing slots at New York's LaGuardia Airport (LGA).103 Trans

World Airlines (TWA) entered into negotiations with Valujet to
lease six of its Atlanta (ATL) - LGA slots.1

°4

Negotiations slowed

when Valujet objected to TWA's requirement that Valujet also
contract for TWA's ground handling services.' 0 5 Believing that
Valujet was no longer interested, TWA began negotiations with
Delta, a dominant, incumbent carrier operating a hub at ATL.106
When TWA and Delta reached agreement on the slot leases,
Valujet asserted its claim that the parties "entered into an illegal
agreement and conspired to restrain trade" and that "Delta has
engaged in illegal acts of monopolization and has attempted to
monopolize the ATL-LGA market. ' 10

7

As to the Section 1

claim, the district court, citing the United States Supreme Court
decision in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp.,'08 granted
both defendant airlines' motions for summary judgment, holding that Valujet failed to prove "that TWA and Delta shared a
conscious commitment to a common scheme designed to
achieve an unlawful objective."'0 9 The court, citing United States
v. Grinnell Corp.,11 highlighted the two elements of the offense
101 Id. at 54 (quoting DOT
U.S.

SECRETARY'S TASK FORCE ON COMPETITION IN THE

DOMESTIC AIRLINE INDUSTRY: AIRPORTS, AIR TRAFFic CONTROL, AND RELATED

3-2 (Feb. 1990)).
No.1:95-cv-2896-GET, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13814, at *9 (N.D. Ga. July 12,
1996).
103 Id. at *24.
104 Id. at *11.
105 Id. at *12.
106 Id. at *17.
107 Id. at *24.
108 465 U.S. 752, 760 (1984).
109 No.1:95-cv-2896-GET, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13814, at *30 (N.D. Ga. July
12, 1996).
110 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
CONCERNS
102
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of monopolization as "(1) the possession of monopoly power in
the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of superior product, business acumen,
or historic accident." However it declined to resolve the Section
2 claim, requiring further discovery.'
New York Airlines v. Dukes County, Martha'sVineyard Airport Commission,1 12 addresses anti-trust litigation as it pertains to airports.
New York Air was denied access to the Martha's Vineyard Airport (MVY).11 In its antitrust argument, New York Air relied on
Section 1 of the Sherman Act which "makes unlawful any 'contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several states.'"11 4 In addition to alleging

that such a contract in fact existed between the Airport and
PBA, an incumbent airline, New York Air was also required to
demonstrate the resultant injury it sustained from such action. 1 5 New York Air asserted that its injury stemmed from the
"loss of business opportunity .

.

. loss of goodwill, and loss of

revenues and profits.""' 6 The Airport moved to dismiss the
claim, arguing that under state law and pursuant to the Parker
Doctrine," 7 its actions are exempt from anti-trust laws." 8 The
district court denied this motion, holding, inter alia, that the
ParkerDoctrine was inapplicable, because the doctrine excludes
conduct undertaken "pursuant to state policy to displace competition with regulation or monopoly public service. '' 1
In a challenge to the rates imposed upon them by the airport,
the two plaintiff airlines in Rocky Mountain Airways, Inc. v. County
of Pitkin120 alleged that the charges were "excessive, unreasona12 1
ble, and discriminatory in violation of federal and state law.'
The Aspen/Pitkin County Airport is owned and operated by Pit111 Valujet Airlines, Inc., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13814, at *14 (citing 15 U.S.C.
§ 2 (2004)).
112 623 F. Supp. 1435 (D. Mass. 1985).
113 Id. at 1440.
114 Id. at 1450 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1).
115 Id.
116

Id.

117 Parker

v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 352 (1943) (providing an exemption for
state conduct if undertaken to displace competition with regulation of monopoly
public service).
118623 F. Supp. at 1451.
119Id.; see also Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 413 (1978).
120 674 F. Supp. 312 (D. Colo. 1987).
121 I.
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kin County, a political subdivision of the state of Colorado. To
fund terminal expansion, the county increased both the landing
fees and terminal rental fees, resulting in the airlines paying
over fifty percent of the airport's operating revenues for only
twenty-nine percent of the airport's operations. 12 2 Among the
claims made by the plaintiff airlines were the arguments "that
the Airport holds a monopoly position, and that the fees and
rentals are unreasonable and therefore in violation of Section 2
of the Sherman Act.' 1 23 A Colorado statute provided that the
operations of airport facilities were "to be public government
functions, exercised for a public purpose, and matters of public
necessity."'12 4 The district court granted the county's motion to
dismiss, holding that "Pitkin County is undeniably acting in its
governmental (rather than proprietary) capacity and ... is im1' 25
mune from the operation of federal antitrust laws.'
IV.

AIRLINE-AIRPORT AGREEMENTS

Facilities lease agreements between airlines and airports are
intricately detailed, delineating such matters as fees, the location of facilities, duration, and exclusivity. Furthermore, these
agreements also detail landing fees, rate calculation methods,
and revenue/cost sharing formulas. One of the primary factors
in constructing these agreements is to designate them as exclusive or non-exclusive.

A.

EXCLUSIVE AGREEMENTS

If an airline has a significant presence at a particular airport,
it may elect to enter into an exclusive lease agreement, which
provides that only that airline will have the use of the specific
facilities. 126 This means that access to these facilities would be
unavailable to other airlines who may wish to gain entry.
Such exclusive agreements have the potential to be mutually
beneficial to the tenant airline and the landlord airport. While
the airline has encumbered itself to the extent that it has assumed an obligation to make the lease payments, it has also
gained control over the gate and terminal space, to the exclu-

124

Id. at 314.
Id.
Id. at 316 (quoting CoLo. REv. STAT. § 41-4-101).

125

Id.

122
123

Telephone Interview with Mr. Jeffrey Letwin, Solicitor, Allegheny County
Airport Authority (Nov. 11, 2003) [hereinafter Letwin Interview].
126
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sion of potential competitors. The airport, for its part, effectively relinquishes control of the facilities. However, in the
process, it gains the assurance of a predictable revenue stream.
1 27 was an
At issue in Air Canada v. Department of Transportation
agreement between American Airlines (American) and Dade
County for construction and renovation of facilities at Miami International Airport (MIA) .12' The agreement provided that
"[A] merican will have exclusive use of the A/D gates so long as
it averages 250 jet flights per day. ' 129 The funding for this construction project derived in part from increased fees charged to
all airlines operating at MIA, resulted in several airlines challenging the reasonableness of the fee increases. The DOT assigned the dispute to an administrative law judge, who found
the fees unreasonable, holding that American should pay a
larger share of the costs.130 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, however, denied the airlines' claims, stating
"[b]ecause facilities are renovated at different times, some airlines will always be subsidizing improvements to facilities used by
other airlines.' 13 ' Such reasoning presupposes that the airlines
will collectively continue leasing facilities at MIA, so as to realize
13 2
the long-term benefits of the improvements.
Recent industry trends seem to indicate a desire on the part
of airport operators to limit these exclusive lease agreements.
At airports where one airline accounts for more than fifty percent of the passenger volume, federal law requires the submission of a plan to increase competition in order to be eligible for
the federal financial aid necessary to fund expansion. 33 In December, 2000, officials at Atlanta Hartsfield International Airport (ATL) submitted such a plan, committing "to end as much
as possible the practice of signing exclusive gate lease agreements and to require airlines that have lease agreements to
meet usage goals or lose control of their gates.' 34 The plan also
proposed a new option, known as preferential gate agreements,
under which "an airline would hold dominant rights to a gate.
148 F.3d 1142, 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
Id.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 1148.
131 Id. at 1151 n.14.
132 Id.
133 Gary Hendricks, Hartsfield City Limits: FAA Studies Airport's Plan to Increase
Competition, ATLANTA JOURNAL & CONSTITUTION, January 15, 2001.
127

128

134

Id.
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But if the airport determined the gate was under-utilized, the
airport could allow another airline to use it. ' 13 5 Another example of this trend is evident at Dallas/Fort Worth International
Airport (DFW), which has vowed to "transition out of exclusiveuse agreements for the future."13' 6 Citing as a primary factor the
concern that an under-utilized, exclusively-leased gate will be
unavailable for use by another carrier, agreements for gates in a
new terminal, planned to open in 2005, will contain provisions
permitting another carrier to use the unused facilities of the ten13 7
ant airline.
1.

Long-Term Leases

As noteworthy as their exclusivity is the duration of lease
agreements. "Historically, most airports have leased space to airlines on an exclusive basis for extended periods of time, usually
15 to 30 years."1 3 8 Agreements dating back to the 1940s are indicative of this tendency. "In 1942 the City and County of San
Francisco ... entered into a formal agreement ... with Trans
World Airlines . . . for a twenty-year term. ' 13 9 The trend has
since continued as evinced by the lease agreement currently in
effect between the city of Philadelphia, which is the governing
entity for the Philadelphia International Airport (PHL), and US
Airways. 40 That agreement was entered into in 1974 and is set
to expire in 2006.141 Such a thirty-two year agreement, while
arguably at the upper limit in terms of duration, is not atypical.
In Montauk-CaribbeanAirways, Inc. v. Hope,1 4 2 for example, Section 352 of New York General Municipal Law authorizes the local legislative body which operates local airports "to enter into
exclusive and non-exclusive contracts . . . not exceeding forty
1 43
years."7
Id.
Bryon Okada, Dallas/Fort Worth Airport Wants to Shorten Exclusive-Use Gate
Leases, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, October 19, 2003, at 8B.
137 Id.
138 Stephen E. Creager, Airline Deregulation and Airport Regulation, 93 YALE L.J.
319, 333 (1983).
139 Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. City of San Francisco, 228 F.2d 473, 474 (9th
Cir. 1955).
4o Marcia Gelbart, Aide Asks about Getting Gates from US Airways at Philadelphia
Airport, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, August 22, 2002, at 1C.
141 Id.
142 784 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1986).
143 Id. at 95-96.
135
136
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Majority-in-Interest

Such long-term agreements, particularly in an industry as volatile as the airline industry, may cause one to question their ultimate usefulness. Perhaps one of the most significant features of
the long-term exclusive lease agreements has been the majorityin-interest clause (the MII clause). As defined in the Airline
Operating Agreement and Terminal Building Lease at Pittsburgh International Airport (PIT), "[m] ajority-in-interest
means, during any Fiscal Year, either: (1) forty percent (40%) in
number of all Signatory Airlines which, in the aggregate, paid
fifty percent (50%) or more of Landing Fees paid by all Signatory Airlines for the preceding Fiscal Year; or (2) all except one
(1) of the Signatory Airlines regardless of the amount of landing
Fees paid by such Signatory Airline."14' 4 The M11 clauses "give
airlines a voice in airport decisions affecting airport-airline financial commitments."' 4 5 Airlines have, in effect, "power that
ranges from the right to veto expansion at an airport, to the
right to approve large capital projects, to the ability to adjust
landing fees or terminal rental fees, to the right to approve
bond sales to raise capital for new construction. 1 4 6
In Air Canada, Inc. v. Dade County & American Airlines,'47 several airlines brought action against Dade County, the operator
of MIA, and one airline tenant, American, alleging that an
agreement between American and the County for construction
of a new terminal, to be used exclusively by American, was in
violation of the agreements between the airlines and the
County. 4 ' Specifically, the airlines argued that, under the terms
of a 1954 Trust Agreement (Trust), they had a "contractual
right to approve all airport projects which are to be funded by
the issuance of airport revenue bonds under Section 210" of the
Trust. 1 49 The airlines relied on language in Supplemental
Agreements, granting MII airlines certain approval rights. That
language read, in relevant part, "[a]dditional amendments to
the projects... shall be subject to the approval of the MajorityPittsburgh International Airport - Airline Operating Agreement and Terminal Building Lease 15 (on file with the author) [hereinafter Pittsburgh
Agreement].
145 Russell A. Klingaman, Predatory Pricingand Other Exclusionary Conduct in the
Airline Industry: Is Antitrust Law the Solution?, 4 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 281, 332 (1992).
146 Imes, supra note 22, at 1079.
147 No. 95-2037, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2534 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 18, 1998).
148 Id. at *2.
149 Id.
144
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In-Interest of Airlines. ' 150 Holding that the Supplemental
Agreements did not require such MII approval, the district court
found "that the parties intended that the MII Airlines have approval over only those projects proposed by the County as
amendments to the existing list of approved projects."' 1 While
the MII clause was not upheld in Air Canada,Inc. v. Dade County,
such clauses remain an integral part of many of today's existing
lease agreements. "As of 1990, fifty-five airports in the United
States functioned with MII clauses."'1 52
B.

NON-EXCLUSIVE AGREEMENTS

The other side of the exclusive lease coin reveals the non-exclusive lease agreement. Airlines which operate only a minimal
number of flights at a given airport may opt for a non-exclusive
lease. 5 3 Under such an arrangement, the facilities are shared
among two or more airlines, each of which utilizes them during
certain times of the day. This is cost-effective for the individual
airlines, given that the lease charges are shared between them.
The airport, in turn, derives benefits from the fact that its facilities are being efficiently utilized, and by retaining control of its
facilities as a result of the non-exclusive lease.' 5 4 At Kansas City
International Airport (MCI), for example, "most key operational areas including hold rooms and gates are leased on a nonexclusive basis, meaning that the airport can re-lease those areas
55
to other carriers if they are not fully used."'1
At Love Field in Dallas (DAL), a 1998 agreement between
American Airlines and Continental Airlines provides for the carriers to share two gates. 56 The airport's Aviation Director ordered the share agreement pursuant to the city's authority
under a "scarce resources" clause contained in the agreement. 15 7 Under the agreement, each airline will have primary
use of its own gate, but, at certain times of the day, each will

153

Id. at *17.
Id. at *18.
Imes, supra note 22, at 1080.
Letwin Interview, supra note 126.

154

Id.

150
151
152

Kansas City Airport Bonds Get A2 Rating On Local Economy, Low-Cost Operations,
AIRPORTS, September 14, 1999, Vol.16, No. 37 at 382, available at http://
155

www.aviationnow.com.
156 American, Continental Settle Differences Over Love Field Gate Sharing, AVIATION
DAILY, August 17, 1998, Vol. 333, No. 33 at 286, available at http://www.aviation
now.com.
157 Id.
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have access to the other's main gate. 15 8 Such a clause permits
effective and efficient allocation of resources and is made possible within the framework of a non-exclusive agreement, since
the airport retains a greater degree of control over its assets
than would be the case in an exclusive lease agreement.1 59
C.

SIGNATORY AND NON-SIGNATORY AIRLINES

In addition to the lease agreements being classified as exclusive or non-exclusive, the individual airlines are designated as
either signatory or non-signatory, depending upon whether or
not they have signed a lease agreement for a specified duration.
A signatory airline "has an airline operating agreement and terminal building lease substantially identical in all respects.., and
with the same expiration date. ' 160 At Denver International Airport (DIA) "[a] irlines that have executed qualifying lease agreements with the City ("signatory airlines") pay different rental
rates than airlines that do not have such agreements ("non-signatory airlines"), and signatory airlines receive a credit for their
share of the airport's net revenues. "161 "Non-signatory airlines
pay rates that are 20% higher than the rates charged to signatory airlines, and non-signatory airlines are not credited with any
portion of net airport revenues. 162 Such a 20% premium exists
for non-signatory carriers operating at Pittsburgh International
Airport (PIT) as well, and is the generally accepted industry
standard.1 6 ' The airport charges a premium to offset the fact
that non-signatory airlines 6are
not committing themselves to a
1 4
lease for a specified term.

D.

USER CLASSIFICATIONS

This leads us to the classification of the two distinct types of
users of airport facilities, and the various calculation methods
employed to determine their respective fees. "Airports collect
the bulk of their revenues from two general groups of users: aeronautical users, such as commercial (passenger) airlines, and
158 Id.
159 Id.

Pittsburgh Agreement, supra note 144, at 21.
Transworld Airlines, Inc. v. City of Denver, No.1995 DOT Av. LEXIS 456, at
*9 (July 21, 1995).
162 Id.
163 Informational brochure: Fees, Charges and Operational Information, 2003,
Pittsburgh International Airport (copy on file with the author).
164 Id.
160

161
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non-aeronautical concessionaires, including car rental agencies,
parking lots, restaurants, gift shops, and other small vendors." 165
Although the latter group is not the focus of this article, a brief
discussion of concessionaire agreements and their fees is nonetheless appropriate, given that such agreements have a significant impact on the aeronautical user agreements.

1.

Non-Aeronautical Users

One example of a non-aeronautical concessionaire agreement
is between the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (Port
Authority), which is the operator of Newark International Airport (EWR), and of independent concessionaires.
Under the terms of the lease, concessionaires have an exclusive
or semi-exclusive right to sell various merchandise including
newspapers in a particular terminal. For this right, the concessionaires pay a fixed base rent plus approximately 17-1/2 percent
of their gross sales. These lease payments from the concessionaires are shared between the Port Authority and the airline [s] .166
Individual concessionaires enter into these special lease agreements to gain the right to use the terminal space, but "use of
that space is subject to the ultimate control and regulation of
1 67
the Port Authority.
Another form of this type of agreement may be found between airports and rental car companies. At Minneapolis-St.
Paul Metropolitan Airport (MSP), agreements between the Metropolitan Airports Commission (MAC) and rental car compa'168
nies are further categorized as "off-Airport" and "on-Airport.
"Off-Airport rental car companies pick up customers at the Airport, but do not otherwise rent space ... on Airport property."
"On-Airport rental car companies rent space at the Airport from
MAC and maintain service counters ...on Airport property." 169
Under MAC Ordinance 85, the fee for off-Airport companies is
8.5% of gross receipts for those transactions taking place on airport property. While not subject to Ordinance 85, on-Airport
companies still pay a fee of 8.5% of gross revenues (all of which
165 Air Transport Ass'n of Am. v. Dep't of Transp., 119 F.3d 38, 39 (D.C. Cir.
1997).
166 Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc., v. Stephen Berger, 716 F. Supp. 140,
143 (D. N.J. 1989).
167 Id. at 156.
168 Enter. Leasing Co. v. Metro. Airports Comm'n, 250 F.3d 1215, 1217 (8th
Cir. 2001).
169 Id. at 1216 n.1.
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are necessarily presumed to have occurred on Airport property), "as well as rental fees based on the amount of Airport
space they occupy.' 170 In EnterpriseLeasing Co. v. MetropolitanAirports Commission, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
MAC was operating within its statutory authority in imposing
such fees. 171 The Enterprisecourt also deemed the 8.5% fee to be
reasonable, noting
other airports' fees to be as high as 10% of
172
gross revenues.

2. Aeronautical Users
Aeronautical users consist primarily of passenger-carrying airlines, although air cargo and general aviation operations are
also included. 173 The source of the airport revenues generated
by these aeronautical users may be traced to the fee structure
174
and the accounting method employed at a particular airport.

E.

FEE STRUCTURES

There are two basic types of fee structures in use between airports and airlines: the residual model and the compensatory
model. 17 5 Under the residual cost method, "[t]he airline assumes the greater financial risk by guaranteeing payment of airport costs.

' 176

Conversely, under the compensatory method,

"[t] he airport authority assumes the financial risk for its operations, and charges airlines on a cost-recovery basis. ' 177 A third

finance method, known as the modified compensatory model, is
in use at PIT. 178 These finance methods are chosen by the airport operator and each method has its own unique advantages
and disadvantages.
1. Residual Method
Under the residual model, all revenues (including concessionaire revenues) generated at the airport are offset against all
costs.' 7 9 Any residual revenue is refunded to the airlines at year
170
171
172
173
174
175

176
177
178

Id. at 1216.
Id. at 1223.
Id. at 1222 n.10.
Hardaway, supra note 100, at 54.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Letwin Interview, supra note 126.

179 1d.
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end, in proportion to their level of usage of the airport. 8 ° A
fortiori, any deficit is correspondingly charged to the airlines.'
The impact on the tenant airlines of the non-aeronautical concessionaire agreements discussed supra, is most prominent in
this model.1 1 2 The airport develops a budget, making necessary
modifications at mid-year. Any surplus or deficit in revenue as a
result of gains or losses relating to the concessionaire agreements is reflected in this budgetary recalculation process. The
amount refunded to the airlines in the event of a surplus, or,
conversely, the amount charged to the airlines in the event of a
deficit, is directly impacted by the concessionaire agreements.18 3
At Stapleton International Airport (Stapleton) in Denver, Colorado, concessionaire "revenues exceed the costs attributed by
Denver for the provision and use of the facilities."'8 4 The City
and County of Denver, as owner and operator of Stapleton, retains this surplus revenue in the Stapleton Capital Improvement
and Replacement Fund, which has "[hiistorically ... been used

for capital expenditures and extraordinary maintenance costs at
1 5 Such a practice exemplifies
Stapleton.""
the overlap and impact of non-aeronautical concessionaire agreements upon aeronautical user agreements. In Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. County of

Kent, Michigan,1 8 6 the tenant airlines challenged the validity of
the fee structure at Kent County International Airport (Kent).
The claim, in relevant part, challenged Kent's allocation of revenues and costs among the three distinct user groups: commercial airlines, general aviation, and non-aeronautical
concessionaires. 87 Under the airport's accounting system, general aviation was being undercharged, while concessionaires
were being overcharged. 88 The airlines alleged, inter alia, that a
portion of the airfield costs should have been allocated to the
concessionaires. 18 9 Affirming the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, the United States Supreme Court held that the fee structure was reasonable and applied the three part test developed in
Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority District v. Delta Airlines,
180

Id.

181 Id.
182
183
184

Id.
Id.
City of Denver v. Cont'l Airlines, 712 F. Supp. 834, 835 (D. Colo. 1989).

185 Id.
186
187
188

510 U.S. 355 (1994).
Id.
Id. at 356.

189 Id.
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Inc. 9 ' Under the Evansville-Vanderburghtest, a fee is held to be
reasonable if it reflects a "uniform, fair and practical standard,"
is based upon a fair approximation of use, "and is neither discriminatory against interstate commerce nor excessive in comparison with the governmental benefit conferred."'191 The
residual method was in use at Los Angeles International Airport
(LAX)until the end of 1992; however, the City of Los Angeles,
the operator of LAX, elected to adopt the compensatory
method instead.1 9 2 Perhaps anticipating a challenge to the reasonableness of its fee structure, the city concluded "that the
practice of setting the annual landing fee so that total airport
revenues would match total airport expenses resulted in a landing fee that was heavily subsidized by non-aeronautical
93
revenues."1
2.

Compensatory Method

Under the compensatory model, airline rates are fixed via
arms-length negotiations between airport and airline representatives.1 94 Such rates vary among tenant airlines, based upon
their status as signatory or non-signatory. Any surplus revenue
goes to the airport, and any budget deficit is borne by the airport.1 95 The terminal complex rental fees for signatory airlines
at PIT are calculated by multiplying the number of square feet
of leased space by the terminal complex rental rate. 9 6 The terminal complex rental rate is "[d] etermined by dividing the net
cost of the Terminal Complex Area ... by the total number of
square feet of Leased Premises of all Signatory Airlines" '9 7 At
Denver International Airport (DIA), "[t] he City uses a "commercial compensatory" methodology to establish the terminal complex rental rates.9' Under this methodology, the passenger
airlines pay the fully allocated cost of the space that they lease or
use . . .plus their share of common use facilities and services.
Signatory airlines would pay an average terminal complex rental
190405 U.S. 707 (1972).
191 Id. at 714, 716-17.
192 L.A. Dep't of Airports v. United States Dep't of Transp., 103 F.3d 1027,
1029 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
193 Id.
194 Letwin Interview, supra note 126.
195 Id.
196 Pittsburgh Agreement, supra note 144, at 69.
197 Id. at 70 (emphasis added).
198 Transworld Airlines, Inc. v. City of Denver, 1995 DOT Av. LEXIS 456, at *8
(July 21, 1995).
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rate of $61.98 per square foot, and non-signatory airlines would
pay $74.38 per square foot."1 99 Common use facilities are defined as "[t] hose areas and facilities used in common by the several airlines.

' 20 0

Such areas include "[1]anding fields, runways,

aprons, taxi-ways, sewerage, water facilities, various lights and
signals, control tower service and other conveniences supplied
by the airport. ' 20 1 As can be seen from these figures, non-signatory airlines are charged a 20% premium as compared to signatory airlines, an industry-wide standard.
The modified compensatory model, not surprisingly, features
a combination of the other two models. Individual portions of
the lease agreement subscribe to either the residual or the compensatory model.202 Airside agreements (gates and gate space)
may be a combination of the two models, and landside agreements (ticket counter space) may be a combination of the two
models. 20 ' Those portions of the agreement that subscribe to

the residual model are accordingly subject to the residual rules
as relates to budget surpluses and deficits, as discussed supra.
Similarly, those portions of the agreement which follow the
compensatory model must conform to the compensatory rules
pertaining to surpluses and deficits.20 4
A variant of the above method was used at the Raleigh-Durham Airport in Raleigh-DurhamAirport Authority v. Delta Air Lines,
Inc. 20 5 Known as a "cost of services system," this method sepa-

rates each operating area's revenues and costs from the
others.20 6 The two principle operating areas are land-side (terminal, concessions) and airside (aviation) operations. 2 7 This
"[t]wo cash register system . . . requires land-side and airside

operations to support 2themselves
independently of the profits
08
or losses of the other.

In addition to the basic models used for calculating fees and
rates, the location of the specific facilities has also been the subject of lease negotiations. Airlines place a certain inherent value
199 Id.
200 Transworld

Airlines, Inc. v. City of San Francisco, 220 F.2d 473, 474 (9th
Cir. 1956).
201 Id.
202 Letwin Interview, supra note 126.
203 Id.
204 Id.
205 429 F. Supp. 1069, 1079 (D.N.C. 1976).
206 Id.
207 Id. at 1078.
208 Id.
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on the location of their leased space, with convenience and accessibility for their passengers among the prime considerations.
In Southern Airways, Inc. v. City of Atlanta,2°9 Southern Airways
was dissatisfied with the allocation plan for future gate space, to
be made available as a result of construction of a proposed midfield terminal at Atlanta Hartsfield International Airport
(ATL).21° Southern proposed that the average rent cost per
square foot be increased or decreased, depending on the location of the space, ranging from a 25% premium to a 25% discount. 211 After unsuccessful attempts to resolve the dispute with
Eastern Air Lines, a competitor airline, "Southern requested the
city of Atlanta to rule upon the matter. The city refused to do
so, stating that 'gate allocations is a matter for the airlines to
agree upon among themselves."' 212 In contrast to the policy at
ATL, PIT allocates space based on the total number of assigned
aircraft parking positions held by signatory airlines. Under this
system, each signatory airline with fewer than fourteen assigned
aircraft parking positions is entitled to preferential assignment
of one position; for those signatory airlines with fourteen or
more assigned aircraft parking positions, fifteen percent of the
total number are preferentially assigned. The balance of these
213
parking positions is exclusively assigned.
3.

Landing Fees

The last, and perhaps most significant, element of the agreements to be discussed is landing fees. The typical landing fee
structure is based upon aircraft weight and the number of landings, "the weight of each plane to be calculated by taking the
maximum allowable landing weight ... as fixed by the Federal
Aviation Administration. 21 4 The landing fees are expressed in
terms of a rate per one thousand pounds of maximum allowable
landing weight. In an agreement entered into in 1971 between
the Raleigh-Durham Airport Authority and its tenant commercial airlines, the rate was thirteen cents per one thousand
pounds landed.2 15 At Los Angeles International Airport (LAX),
209
210
211
212

S. Airways, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 428 F. Supp. 1010 (N.D. Ga. 1977).
Id. at 1013.
Id.
Id.

213 Pittsburgh Agreement, supra note 144, at 36.
214 Raleigh-Durham Airport Auth. v. Delta Air Lines,

1070 (E.D.N.C. 1976).
215
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the rate was calculated using the residual method, discussed
supra, until 1992, and was thus variable from year to year. In
1982, the rate was seventy-five cents per one thousand pounds;
in 1989 it decreased to twenty-six cents; in 1992 it was fifty-one
cents per one thousand pounds.2 16 The 2003 published rate for
non-signatory airlines at the Pittsburgh International Airport
(PIT) was $2.09 per one thousand pounds. 2 17 To provide a
frame of reference, at the maximum allowable landing weight
for a Boeing 737-400 airliner of 121,000 pounds, the 1971 rate at
Raleigh-Durham would have yielded a landing fee of $15.73 per
landing (acknowledging that the B-737-400 was not yet in use at
that time).218 By comparison, the 2003 PIT rate results in a
landing fee of $252.89.219 This seemingly wide disparity in fees
is due in part to the thirty-year lapse of time, as well as to the
difference in rates for signatory and non-signatory airlines.
There have been numerous challenges to the reasonableness
of the fees established by airports. In Evansville-VanderburghAirport Authority v. Delta Airlines, Inc.,2 2 ° several airlines challenged
the constitutionality of a one dollar per commercial airline passenger charge, intended "to help defray the costs of airport construction and maintenance. '221 The United States Supreme
Court reversed the lower courts' decisions and validated such a
charge, provided that it reflects a "uniform, fair and practical
standard," is based upon a fair approximation of use, "and is
neither discriminatory against interstate commerce nor exces222
sive in comparison with the governmental benefit conferred.
In New England Legal Foundation v. Massachusetts Port Authority, 2 23 airport users challenged the validity of a new landing fee
structure at Boston-Logan International Airport (BOS).224 In
1988, the Massachusetts Port Authority (Massport) enacted a
program, known as the Program for Airport Capacity Efficiency
(PACE), designed to "maximize the efficient use of Logan AirL.A. Dep't of Airports, v. United States Dep't of Transp., 103 F.3d 1027,
1029 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
217 Informational brochure: Fees, Charges and Operational Information, 2003,
Pittsburgh International Airport (copy on file with the author).
218 US AiRWAYS B-737 PILOT'S HANDBOOK, 2-6.
216

219
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The new landing fee structure contained within PACE
departed from the standard landing weight-based method and,
instead, calculated landing fees based on a flat fee of $91.78 per
landing, plus a charge of $0.5417 per one thousand pounds of
landed aircraft weight. 226 This resulted in disproportionately
higher fees for smaller aircraft and a reduction in fees for airlines. Relying on Evansville-Vanderburgh, the district court held
that the fee structure was "reasonable because it had been fixed
according to [a] uniform, fair and practical standard . .. and
was non-excessive in comparison with the governmental benefit
conferred. '2 27 The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
lower court's decision.
Indianapolis Airport Authority v. American Airlines, Inc. 228 involved another dispute over the reasonableness of fees charged.
After the expiration of several airlines' leases, the Indianapolis
Airport Authority unilaterally imposed a new user fee on the airlines, in the form of an increase in the per square foot rental
charge, from $17.55 to $21.95.229 The airlines alleged that this
fee, allocated on the amount of space used, assigned dispropor23 0
tionately lower costs to smaller users such as concessionaires.
A second component of the disproportionate charges resulted
from the Airport Authority's failure to collect landing fees from
general aviation users. The airlines, meanwhile, were subjected
to an increase in the landing fee rate, from $0.46 to $0.6771 per
one thousand pounds gross landing weight. 23 1 The Airport Authority reasoned that the cost of collecting those fees from general aviation users would equal nearly half of the amount of the
fee itself.2 2 Instead, the Airport Authority imposed a "fuel flowage fee," a charge per gallon of fuel consumed. The flowage
fee, however, failed to generate adequate revenue in relation to
general aviation costs. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's holding that the disproportionality of
the fee was unreasonable and the court invalidated the fee.2 33
225
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V. CONCLUSION
During the more than forty years of regulation, the airlines
have enjoyed government subsidies, protection from competition, and anti-trust immunity. Since the advent of deregulation
in 1978, however, the airline industry has undergone monumental changes. Dozens of upstart airlines have emerged and failed
under this deregulated structure. The relatively few new-entrant, low-cost carriers that have survived have gained a foothold
and now provide formidable competition to the established carriers that remain. These new-entrant carriers take issue with the
long-term, exclusive agreements between established carriers
and airport proprietors. But, through such leases, the established carriers have provided a predictable revenue stream for
airport proprietors for decades. It is the very existence of these
agreements which has made available the facilities that the newentrant carriers now enjoy. Revenues generated through these
agreements have been used to fund airport construction and expansion projects, the benefit of which has accrued to new-entrant carriers in recent years. The established carriers have
subsidized the infrastructure of today's aviation environment in
such areas as the development, expansion, and renovation of
hub airports. While competitors raise objections to the existing
agreements on anti-trust grounds, they nevertheless derive revenues from these facilities without having incurred the commitments and obligations associated with such agreements.
While non-signatory airlines are charged an industry-standard
premium of twenty percent above the lease rates for signatory
carriers, this differential is designed to compensate the airport
proprietor for the carriers' unwillingness to commit to a lease
for a specified term. It does not address the fact that the established carriers have incurred long-term obligations in exchange
for their long-term, exclusive leases. Recognizing the vast obligations and commitments assumed by the established carriers as
a result of entering into long-term agreements many years ago,
some commensurate level of contribution by the new-entrant
carriers would be appropriate, such as requiring a portion of
revenues to be directed to an airport improvement fund,
whether nationally or at individual airports. Contributions from
carriers which have not participated in long-term leases would
be at a higher percentage than their competitors. Under such a
system, all carriers could choose to avail themselves of the benefits of long-term lease agreements, provided they are willing to
assume the obligation of commitment.

800

JOURNAL OFAIR LAW AND COMMERCE

[69

Finally, the composition of the airport's fee structure in lease
agreements has also seen challenges from the airlines. These
challenges have most commonly been in reference to the allocation of costs and revenues among the airport's users, namely
aeronautical and non-aeronautical. As government entities, airports and their proprietors may establish these fees. As long as
the airport and its facilities are accessible to its users on a nondiscriminatory basis, the fees are generally deemed to be reasonable. Potential future disputes may be avoided by establishing a
nationwide formula for allocation of costs and revenues, with
individual adjustments for specific airports to be negotiated between the carriers and the airport proprietor.
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